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ABSTRACT
Skip connections are an essential component of current state-of-the-art deep neu-
ral networks (DNNs) such as ResNet, WideResNet, DenseNet, and ResNeXt. De-
spite their huge success in building deeper and more powerful DNNs, we identify
a surprising security weakness of skip connections in this paper. Use of skip con-
nections allows easier generation of highly transferable adversarial examples.
Specifically, in ResNet-like (with skip connections) neural networks, gradients
can backpropagate through either skip connections or residual modules. We find
that using more gradients from the skip connections rather than the residual mod-
ules according to a decay factor, allows one to craft adversarial examples with
high transferability. Our method is termed Skip Gradient Method (SGM). We
conduct comprehensive transfer attacks against state-of-the-art DNNs including
ResNets, DenseNets, Inceptions, Inception-ResNet, Squeeze-and-Excitation Net-
work (SENet) and robustly trained DNNs. We show that employing SGM on the
gradient flow can greatly improve the transferability of crafted attacks in almost
all cases. Furthermore, SGM can be easily combined with existing black-box at-
tack techniques, and obtain high improvements over state-of-the-art transferability
methods. Our findings not only motivate new research into the architectural vul-
nerability of DNNs, but also open up further challenges for the design of secure
DNN architectures.
1 INTRODUCTION
In deep neural networks (DNNs), a skip connection builds a short-cut from a shallow layer to a deep
layer by connecting the input of a convolutional block (also known as the residual module) directly
to its output. While different layers of a neural network learn different “levels” of features, skip
connections can help preserve low-level features and avoid performance degradation when adding
more layers. This has been shown to be crucial for building very deep and powerful DNNs such as
ResNet (He et al., 2016a;b), WideResNet (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016), DenseNet (Huang et al.,
2017) and ResNeXt (Xie et al., 2017). In the meantime, despite their superior performance, DNNs
have been found extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples (or attacks), which are input exam-
ples slightly perturbed with an intention to fool the network to make a wrong prediction (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2018; Bai et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019). Adver-
sarial examples often appear imperceptible to human observers, and are transferable across different
models (Liu et al., 2017). This has raised security concerns on the deployment of DNNs in security
critical scenarios, such as face recognition (Sharif et al., 2016), autonomous driving (Evtimov et al.,
2018), video analysis (Jiang et al., 2019) and medical diagnosis (Ma et al., 2019).
Adversarial examples can be crafted following either a white-box setting (the adversary has full
access to the target model) or a black-box setting (the adversary has no information of the target
model). White-box methods such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014),
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2016), Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) (Madry et al.,
2018) and Carlini and Wagner (CW) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) often suffer from low transferability
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Figure 1: Left: Illustration of the last 3 skip connections (green lines) and residual modules (black
boxes) of a ImageNet-trained ResNet-18. Right: The success rate (in the form of “white-box/black-
box”) of adversarial attacks crafted using gradients flowing through either a skip connection (going
upwards) or a residual module (going leftwards) at each junction point (circle). Three example
backpropagation paths are highlighted in different colors, with the green path skipping over the last
two residual modules having the best attack success rate while the red path through all 3 residual
modules having the worst attack success rate. The attacks are crafted by BIM on 5000 ImageNet
validation images under maximum L∞ perturbation  = 16 (pixel values are in [0, 255]). The
black-box success rate is tested against a VGG19 target model.
in a black-box setting, thus posing only limited threats to DNN models which are usually kept secret
in practice (Dong et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019). Several techniques have been proposed to improve
the transferability of black-box attacks crafted on a surrogate model, such as momentum boosting
(Dong et al., 2018), diverse input (Xie et al., 2019) and translation invariance (Dong et al., 2019).
Although these techniques are effective, they (as well as white-box methods) all treat the entire
network (either the target model or the surrogate model) as a single component while ignore its
inner architectural characteristics. The question of whether or not the DNN architecture itself can
expose more transferability of adversarial attacks is an unexplored problem.
In this paper, we identify one such weakness about the skip connections used by many state-of-the-
art DNNs. We first conduct a toy experiment with the BIM attack and ResNet-18 on the ImageNet
validation dataset (Deng et al., 2009) to investigate how skip connections affect the adversarial
strength of attacks crafted on the network. At each of the last 3 skip connections and residual
modules of ResNet-18, we illustrate the success rate of attacks crafted using gradients backpropagate
through either the skip connection or the residual module in Figure 1. As can be observed, the
success rate drops more drastically whenever using gradients from a residual module instead of
the skip connection. This implies that gradients from the skip connections are more vulnerable
(high success rate). In addition, we surprisingly find that skip connections expose more transferable
information. For example, the black-box success rate was even improved from 52.52% to 62.10%
when the attack skips the last two residual modules (following the path in green color).
Motivated by the above observations, in this paper, we propose the Skip Gradient Method (SGM)
to generate adversarial examples using gradients more from the skip connections rather than the
residual modules. In particular, SGM utilizes a decay factor to reduce gradients from the residual
modules. We find that this simple adjustment on the gradient flow can generate highly transferable
adversarial examples, and the more skip connections in a network, the more transferable are the
crafted attacks. This is in sharp contrast to the design principles (e.g., “going deeper” with skip
connections) underpinning many modern DNNs. In particular, our main contributions are:
• We identify one surprising property of skip connections in ResNet-like neural networks, i.e., they
allow an easy generation of highly transferable adversarial examples.
• We propose the Skip Gradient Method (SGM) to craft adversarial examples using gradients more
from the skip connections. Using a single decay factor on gradients, SGM is an appealingly simple
and generic technique that can be used by any existing gradient-based attack methods.
• We provide comprehensive transfer attack experiments, from different source models against 10
state-of-the-art DNNs, showing that SGM can greatly improve the transferability of crafted adver-
sarial examples. When combined with existing transfer techniques, SGM improves the state-of-
the-art transferability benchmarks by a large margin.
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2 RELATED WORK
Existing adversarial attacks can be categorized into two groups: 1) white-box attacks and 2) black-
box attacks. In the white-box setting, the adversary has full access to the parameters of the target
model, while in the black-box setting, the target model is kept secret from the adversary.
2.1 WHITE-BOX ATTACKS
Given a clean example x with class label y and a target DNN model f , the goal of an adversary is
to find an adversarial example xadv that fools the network into making an incorrect prediction (eg.
f(xadv) 6= y), while still remaining in the -ball centered at x (eg. ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤ ).
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014). FGSM perturbs clean example x
for one step by the amount of  along the gradient direction:
xadv = x+  · sign(∇x`(f(x), y)). (1)
The Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2016) is an iterative version of FGSM that per-
turbs for T steps with step size /T .
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018). PGD perturbs normal example x for T
steps with smaller step size. After each step of perturbation, PGD projects the adversarial example
back onto the -ball of x, if it goes beyond the -ball:
xt+1adv = Π
(
xtadv + α · sign(∇x`(f(xtadv), y))
)
, (2)
where Π(·) is the projection operation. Different to BIM, PGD allows step size α > /T .
There are also other types of white-box attacks including sparsity-based methods such as Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot et al., 2016), sparse attack (Modas et al., 2019), one-
pixel attack (Su et al., 2019), and optimization-based methods such as Carlini and Wagner (CW)
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017) and elastic-net (EAD) (Chen et al., 2018).
2.2 BLACK-BOX ATTACKS
Black-box attacks can be generated by either attacking a surrogate model or using gradient estima-
tion methods in combination with queries to the target model. Gradient estimation methods estimate
the gradients of the target model using black-box optimization methods such as Finite Differences
(FD) (Chen et al., 2017; Bhagoji et al., 2018) or Natural Evolution Strategies (NES) (Ilyas et al.,
2018; Jiang et al., 2019). These methods all require a large number of queries to the target model,
which not only reduces efficiency but also potentially exposes the attack. Alternatively, black-box
adversarial examples can be crafted on a surrogate model then applied to attack the target model.
Although the white-box methods can be directly applied on the surrogate model, they are far less
effective in the black-box setting (Dong et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019). Several transfer techniques
have been proposed to improve the transferability of black-box attacks.
Momentum Iterative boosting (MI) (Dong et al., 2018). MI incorporates a momentum term into
the gradient to boost the transferability:
xt+1adv = Π
(
xtadv + α · sign(gt+1)
)
, gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇x`(f(x
t
adv), y)
‖∇x`(f(xtadv), y)‖1
, (3)
where gt is the adversarial gradient at the t-th step, α = /T is the step size for a total of T steps, µ
is a decay factor, and ‖ · ‖1 is the L1 norm.
Diverse Input (DI) (Xie et al., 2019). DI proposes to craft adversarial exampels using gradient with
respect to the randomly-transformed input example:
xt+1adv = Π
(
xtadv + α · sign(∇x`(f(H(xtadv; p)), y))
)
, (4)
where H(xtadv; p) is a stochastic transformation function on x
t
adv for a given probability p.
Translation Invariant (TI) (Dong et al., 2019). TI targets to evade robustly trained DNNs by
generating adversarial examples that are less sensitive to the discriminative regions of the surrogate
model. More specifically, TI computes the gradients with respect to a set of translated versions of
the original input:
xt+1adv = Π
(
xtadv + α · sign(W ∗ ∇x`(f(xtadv), y))
)
, (5)
3
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2020
where W is a predefined kernel (e.g., uniform, linear, and Gaussian) matrix of size (2k + 1)(2k +
1) (k being the maximal number of pixels to shift). This kernel convolution is equivalent to the
weighted sum of gradients over (2k + 1)2 number of shifted input examples.
Furthermore, there are other studies focusing on intermediate feature representations. For example,
Activation Attack (Inkawhich et al., 2019) drives the activation of a specified layer on a given image
towards the layer of a target image, to yield a highly transferable targeted example. Intermediate
Level Attack (Huang et al., 2019) attempts to fine-tune an existing adversarial example for greater
black-box transferability by increasing its perturbation on a pre-specified layer of the source model.
Although the above transfer techniques are effective, they (including white-box attacks) either 1)
treat the network (either the surrogate model or the target model) as a single component or 2) only
use the intermediate layer output of the network. In other words, they do not directly consider the
effects of different DNN architectural characteristics. In the following, we exploits an architectural
property of skip connection regarding the transferability of adversarial examples.
3 PROPOSED SKIP GRADIENT ATTACK
In this section, we first introduce the gradient decomposition of skip connection and residual module.
Following that, we propose our Skip Gradient Method (SGM), then demonstrate the adversarial
transferability property of skip connection via a case study.
3.1 GRADIENT DECOMPOSITION WITH SKIP CONNECTIONS
In ResNet-like neural networks, a skip connection uses identity mapping to bypass residual layers,
allowing data flow from a shallow layer directly to subsequent deep layers. Thus, we can decompose
the network into a collection of paths of different lengths (Veit et al., 2016). We denote a skip
connection together with its associated residual module as a building block (residual block) of a
network. Considering three successive building blocks (eg. zi+1 = zi + fi+1(zi)) in a residual
network from input z0 to output z3, the output z3 can be expanded as:
z3 = z2 + f3(z2) = [z1 + f2(z1)] + f3(z1 + f2(z1))
= [z0 + f1(z0) + f2(z0 + f1(z0))] + f3
(
(z0 + f1(z0)) + f2(z0 + f1(z0))
)
.
(6)
According to the chain rule in calculus, the gradient of a loss function ` with respect to input z0 can
then be decomposed as,
∂`
∂z0
=
∂`
∂z3
∂z3
∂z2
∂z2
∂z1
∂z1
∂z0
=
∂`
∂z3
(1 +
∂f3
∂z2
)(1 +
∂f2
∂z1
)(1 +
∂f1
∂z0
). (7)
Extending this toy example to a network with L residual blocks, the gradient can be decomposed
from L-th to the (l + 1)-th (0 ≤ l < L) residual block as,
∂`
∂x
=
∂`
∂zL
L−1∏
i=l
(∂fi+1
∂zi
+ 1
)∂zl
∂x
. (8)
The example illustrated in Figure 1 is a the above decomposition of a ResNet-18 at the last 3 building
blocks (l = L− 3).
3.2 SKIP GRADIENT METHOD (SGM)
In order to use more gradient from the skip connections, here, we introduce a decay parameter
into the decomposed gradient to reduce the gradient from the residual modules. Following the
decomposition in Equation (8), the “skipped” gradient is,
∇x` = ∂`
∂zL
L−1∏
i=0
(
γ
∂fi+1
∂zi
+ 1
)∂z0
∂x
, (9)
where z0 = x is the input of the network, and γ ∈ (0, 1] is the decay parameter. Accordingly, given
a clean example x and a DNN model f , an adversarial example can be crafted iteratively by,
xt+1adv = Π
(
xtadv + α · sign
( ∂`
∂zL
L−1∏
i=0
(γ
∂fi+1
∂zi
+ 1)
∂z0
∂x
))
. (10)
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Table 1: The success rates (%±std over 5 random runs) of black-box attacks (untargeted) crafted
by PGD and its “skip gradient” (SGM) version, on different source models against a Inception V3
target model. The best results are in bold.
RN18 RN34 RN50 RN101 RN152 DN121 DN169 DN201
PGD 23.23±0.69 24.38±0.41 22.80±0.55 22.98±0.83 26.56±0.75 30.71±0.60 30.90±0.31 36.01±0.59
SGM 28.92±0.45 43.43±0.32 36.71±0.55 38.38±0.53 44.84±0.14 57.38±0.14 60.45±0.42 65.48±0.23
SGM is a generic technique that can be easily implemented on any neural network that has skip
connections. During the backpropagation process, SGM simply multiplies the decay parameter to
the gradient whenever it passes a residual module. Therefore, SGM does not require any computa-
tion overhead, and works efficiently even on densely connected networks such as DenseNets. The
reduction of residual gradients is accumulated along the backpropagation path, that is, the residual
gradients at lower layers will be reduced more times than those at higher layers. This is because,
compared to high-level features, low-level features have already been well preserved by skip con-
nections (see feature decompositions in Equation (6)).
3.3 ADVERSARIAL TRANSFERABILITY WITH SKIP CONNECTIONS: A CASE STUDY
To demonstrate the adversarial transferability of skip connections, we conduct a case study on 10-
step PGD, and their corresponding SGM versions, to investigate the success rates of black-box
attacks crafted with or without manipulating the skip connections. The black-box attacks are gen-
erated on 8 different source (surrogate) models ResNet(RN)-18/34/50/101/152 and DenseNet(DN)-
121/169/201, then applied to attack a Inception V3 target model. All models were trained on Ima-
geNet training set. We randomly select 5000 ImageNet validation images that are correctly classified
by all source models, and craft untargeted attacks under maximum L∞ perturbation  = 16, which
is a typical black-box setting (Dong et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019; Dong et al., 2019). The step size
of PGD was set to α = 2, and the decay parameter of SGM was set to γ = 0.5.
We run the attack for 5 times with different random seeds, and report the success rates (transferabil-
ity) of different methods in Table 1. As can be seen, when the skip connections are manipulated with
our SGM, the transferability of PGD is greatly improved across all source models. On all source
models except RN18, the improvements are more than 13%. Without SGM, the best transferability
against the Inception-V3 target model is 35.48% which is achieved by PGD on DN201, however,
this is improved further by our proposed SGM to 65.38% ( > 29% gain). This not only highlights
the surprising property of skip connections in terms of the generation of highly transferable attacks,
but also indicates the significance of this property, as such a huge boost in transferability only takes
a single decay factor.
The 8 source models can be interpreted as from 3 ResNet families: 1) RN18/34 are ResNets with
normal residual blocks, 2) RN50/101/152 are ResNets with “bottleneck” residual blocks, and 3)
DN121/169/201 are densely connected ResNets. Another important observation is that when there
are more skip connections in a network within the same ResNet family (e.g., RN34 > RN18,
RN152 > RN101 > RN50, and DN201 > DN169 > DN121), or from ResNets to DenseNets (e.g.
DN121/169/201 > RN18/34 and DN121/169/201 > RN50/101/152), the crafted adversarial exam-
ples become more transferable, especially when the skip connections are manipulated by our SGM.
This raises questions about the design principle behind many state-of-the-art DNNs: “going deeper”
with techniques like skip connection and 1× 1 convolution.
4 COMPARISON TO EXISTING TRANSFER ATTACKS
In this section, we compare the transferability of adversarial examples crafted by our proposed SGM
and existing methods on ImageNet against both unsecured and secured target models.
Baselines. We compare SGM with FGSM, PGD, and 3 state-of-the-art transfer attacks: (1) Momen-
tum Iterative (MI) (Dong et al., 2018), (2) Diverse Input (DI) (Xie et al., 2019), and (3) Transition
Invariant (TI) (Dong et al., 2019). Note that the TI attack was originally proposed to attack secured
models, although here we include TI to attack both unsecured models and secured models. For TI
and our SGM, we test both the one-step and the iterative version, however, the other methods DI and
MI only have an iterative version. The iteration step is set to 10 and 20 for unsecured and secured
target models respectively. For all iterative methods PGD, TI and our SGM, the step size is set to
α = 2. For our proposed SGM, the decay parameter is set to γ = 0.2 (0.5) and γ = 0.5 (0.7)
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on ResNet and DenseNet source models in PGD (FGSM) respectively. For simplicity, we utilize
SGM to indicate FGSM+SGM in one-step attacks, and PGD+SGM in multi-step attacks. Other
parameters of existing methods are configured as in their original papers.
Threat Model. We adopt a black-box threat model in which adversarial examples are generated
by attacking a source model and then applied to attack the target model. The target model is of a
different architecture (indicated by the model name) to the source model, expect when the source
and target models are of the same architecture, where we directly use the source model as the tar-
get model (equivalent to a white-box setting). The attacks are crafted on 5000 randomly selected
ImageNet validation images that are classified correctly by all source models, and are repeated for
5 times with different random seeds. For all attack methods, we follow the standard setting (Dong
et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019) to craft untargeted attacks under maximum L∞ perturbation  = 16
with respect to pixel values in [0, 255].
Target Models. We consider two types of target models: 1) unsecured models that are trained on
ImageNet training set using traditional training; and 2) secured models trained using adversarial
training. For unsecured target model, we choose 7 state-of-the-art DNNs: VGG19 (with batch
normalization) (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015), ResNet-152 (RN152) (He et al., 2016a), DenseNet-
201 (DN152), 154 layer Squeeze-and-Excitation network (SE154) (Hu et al., 2018), Inception V3
(IncV3) (Szegedy et al., 2016), Inception V4 (IncV3) (Szegedy et al., 2017) and Inception-ResNet
V2 (IncResV2) (Szegedy et al., 2017). For secured target models, we consider 3 robustly trained
DNNs using ensemble adversarial training (Trame`r et al., 2018): IncV3ens3 (ensemble of 3 IncV3
networks), IncV3ens4 (ensemble of 4 IncV3 networks) and IncResV2ens3 (ensemble of 3 IncResV2
networks).
Source Models. We choose 8 different source models from the ResNet family: ResNet(RN)-
18/34/50/101/152 and DenseNet(DN)-121/169/201. Whenever the input size of the source model
does not match the target model, we resize the crafted adversarial images to the input size of the tar-
get model. For VGG19, ResNet and DenseNet models, images are cropped and resized to 224×224,
while for Inception/Inception-ResNet models, images are cropped and resized to 299× 299.
4.1 TRANSFERABILITY AGAINST UNSECURED MODELS
We first investigate the transferability of all attack methods against 7 unsecured models, which is to
find the best method that can generate the most transferable attacks on one source model against all
target models.
One-step Transferability. The one-step transferability is measured by the success rate of one-step
attacks, as reported in Table 2. Here, we only show the results on two source models: 1) RN152
which is the best ResNet source model with the highest success rate on average against all target
models, and 2) DN201 which is the best DenseNet source model. Also note that, when the source
and target models are the same, the result represents the white-box success rate. Overall, adversarial
examples crafted on DN201 have significantly better transferability than those crafted on RN152,
especially for our SGM method. This is because there are ∼ 30× more skip connections that can
be manipulated by our SGM in DN201 compared to RN152. In comparison to to both FGSM
and TI, transferability is improved considerably by SGM in almost all test scenarios, except when
transferring from RN152 to VGG19/IncV3/IncV4 where SGM is outperformed by TI. This implies
that, when transfereing across different architectures (eg. ResNet → VGG/Inception), translation
adaptation may help increase the transferability of one-step perturbations. However, this advantage
of TI disappears when there are more skip connections, as is the case for the DN201 source model.
Table 2: One-step transferability: the success rates (%±std over 5 random runs) of black-box attacks
crafted by different methods on 2 source models against 7 unsecured target models. The best results
are in bold.
Source Attack VGG19 RN152 DN201 SE154 IncV3 IncV4 IncResV2
RN152
FGSM 41.96±0.52 71.53±0.34 37.49±0.10 30.00±0.56 25.66±0.07 21.55±0.16 19.90±0.49
TI 49.61±0.11 49.33±0.35 36.87±0.42 29.95±0.32 33.59±0.73 29.05±0.34 20.62±0.09
SGM 47.54±0.14 76.90±0.60 43.73±0.21 31.16±0.45 29.41±0.24 25.11±0.20 22.63±0.15
DN201
FGSM 49.87±0.17 38.89±0.29 81.51±0.33 34.94±0.53 31.21±0.47 27.08±0.23 23.87±0.45
TI 54.37±0.58 33.49±0.18 57.71±0.05 34.46±0.47 34.45±0.25 30.17±0.23 20.36±0.33
SGM 56.97±0.25 47.54±0.14 87.73±0.76 42.31±0.67 37.91±0.56 32.83±0.38 29.64±0.25
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Figure 2: The attack success rates of black-box attacks crafted by different attack methods on 8
source models against 3 unsecured target models: VGG19 (left), SE154 (middle) and IncV3 (right).
Table 3: Multi-step transferability: the success rates (%±std over 5 random runs) of black-box
attacks crafted by different methods on 2 source models against 7 unsecured target models. The best
results are in bold.
Source Attack VGG19 RN152 DN201 SE154 IncV3 IncV4 IncRes
RN152
PGD 45.03±0.21 99.91±0.04 51.49±0.51 29.35±0.49 26.56±0.75 21.03±0.19 19.10±0.37
TI 54.59±0.63 99.73±0.11 63.77±0.93 41.89±0.58 37.97±0.39 36.25±1.13 28.90±0.52
MI 65.42±0.60 99.77±0.02 75.79±0.69 53.07±0.44 50.22±0.07 43.32±0.27 41.71±0.36
DI 74.01±0.48 99.90±0.02 77.81±0.80 57.49±1.22 53.95±0.68 47.16±0.52 43.47±0.30
SGM 79.90±0.69 99.87±0.03 81.56±0.35 61.83±0.17 57.22±0.51 48.57±0.09 45.44±0.36
DN201
PGD 57.61±0.82 59.84±0.76 99.89±0.02 39.78±0.69 36.01±0.59 31.76±0.27 25.92±0.13
TI 54.90±0.75 50.63±1.02 99.64±0.07 40.40±0.31 39.13±0.52 37.03±1.00 28.83±0.49
MI 75.09±0.80 76.39±0.61 99.84±0.05 64.38±0.69 59.62±0.36 54.85±0.56 50.05±0.25
DI 78.11±0.56 78.18±0.91 99.81±0.05 61.75±0.88 60.04±0.81 56.15±0.36 49.00±0.83
SGM 82.66±0.29 86.65±0.50 99.67±0.08 72.03±0.53 65.48±0.23 58.77±0.78 54.97±0.25
Multi-step Transferability. First we provide a detailed study about the transferability of all attack
methods from the 8 source models to the 3 representative unsecured target models. We then com-
pare different attack methods on two best source models against all unsecured target models: the
best ResNet source model and the best DenseNet source model. The multi-step (e.g., 10 step) trans-
ferability from all source models to three representative target models (VGG19, SE154 and IncV3)
is illustrated in Figure 2. In all transfer scenarios, our proposed SGM outperforms existing methods
consistently on almost all source models except RN18. Adversarial attacks crafted by SGM become
more transferable when there are more skip connections in the source model (e.g., from RN18 to
DN201). An interesting observation is that, when the target model is shallow such as VGG19 (left
figure in Figure 2), shallow source models transfer better, however, when the target model is deep
such as SE154 and IncV3 (middle and right figures in Figure 2), deeper source models tend to have
better transferability. We suspect this is due to the architectural similarities shared by the target and
source models. Note that against the VGG19 target model, the success rate of baseline methods all
drop significantly when the ResNet source models become more complex (from RN18 to RN152).
The small variations at RN50 and DN121 source models may be caused by the architectural differ-
ence between RN18/34 which consist of normal residual blocks, RN50/101/152 which consist of
“bottleneck” residual blocks and DN121/169/201 which has dense skip connections.
Results for the best source models RN152 and DN201 against unsecured target models are reported
in Table 3. The proposed SGM attack outperforms existing methods by a large margin consistently
against different target models. Particularly, for transfer DN201→ SE154 (a recent state-of-the-art
DNN with only 2.251% top-5 error on ImageNet), SGM achieves a success rate of 72.03%, which
is > 7% and > 10% higher than MI and DI respectively.
Combining with Existing Methods. We further demonstrate that the adversarial transferability of
skip connections can be exploited in combination with existing techniques. The experiments are
conducted on DN201 (the best source model in the above multi-step experiments), and TI attack is
excluded as it was originally proposed against secured models and demonstrates limited improve-
ment over PGD against unsecured models. The results are reported in Table 4*. The transferability
of MI and DI is improved remarkably of 11.98%∼ 21.98% by SGM. When combined with both MI
*For simplicity, we omit the standard deviations here as they are very small, which hardly effect the results.
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Table 4: Combined with existing methods: the success rates (%) of attacks crafted on source model
DN201 against 7 unsecured target models. The best results are in bold and + indicates improvement.
Attack \Target VGG19 RN152 DN201 SE154 IncV3 IncV4 IncRes
MI 75.09 76.39 99.84 64.38 59.62 54.85 50.05
MI+SGM +12.01 +13.24 99.52 +17.16 +21.88 +15.57 +18.35
DI 78.11 78.18 99.81 61.75 60.04 56.15 49.00
DI+SGM +12.28 +13.76 99.52 +20.92 +17.66 +15.78 +20.20
MI+DI 87.16 87.28 99.76 79.80 76.68 75.20 71.05
MI+DI+SGM 93.00 93.92 99.42 89.86 85.72 81.23 80.50
Table 5: Transferability against secured models: the success rates (%±std over 5 random runs) of
multi-step attacks crafted on RN152 and DN201 source models against 3 secured models. The best
results are in bold.
Source Attack IncV3ens3 IncVens4 IncResens3
RN152
PGD 12.47±1.27 10.72±1.37 6.97±0.71
TI 45.36±0.97 45.81±0.93 38.19±0.81
MI 24.20±1.15 22.04±0.98 16.10±0.56
DI 28.48±1.21 24.19±1.22 17.31±0.77
SGM 31.57±0.55 27.77±0.47 20.02±0.66
TI+SGM 52.62±0.40 52.80±0.79 43.96±0.62
DN201
PGD 18.16±0.56 15.30±0.62 10.40±0.49
TI 42.76±0.91 42.01±0.79 34.28±0.88
MI 31.79±0.83 28.21±0.15 20.60±0.38
DI 34.84±1.35 29.23±0.83 21.64±0.80
SGM 41.45±0.30 37.85±0.22 29.41±0.02
TI+SGM 46.11±1.23 47.38±0.89 39.32±0.80
and DI, SGM improves the state-of-the-art (MI+DI) transferability by a huge margin consistently
against all target models. In particular, SGM pushes the new state-of-the-art to at least 80.52%
which previously was only 71%. This illustrates that skip connections can be easily manipulated to
craft highly transferable attacks against many state-of-the-art DNN models.
4.2 TRANSFERABILITY AGAINST ROBUSTLY TRAINED MODELS
The success rates of our SGM and other baseline methods against the 3 secured target models are
reported in Table 5. Overall, with translation adaptation specifically designed for evading adversar-
ially trained models, TI achieves the best standalone transferability, while SGM is the second best
with higher success rates than either PGD, MI or DI. When combined with TI, SGM also improves
the TI attack by a considerable margin across all transfer scenarios. This indicates that, although
manipulating the skip connections alone may not sufficient to attack secured models, it still can
make existing attacks more powerful. One interesting observation is that attacks crafted here on
RN152 are more transferable than those crafted on DN201, which is quite the opposite to attacking
unsecured models.
4.3 A CLOSER LOOK AT SGM
In this part, we conduct more experiments to investigate the gradient decay factor of our proposed
SGM, and explore the potential use of SGM for ensemble-based attacks and white-box attacks.
Effect of Residual Gradient Decay γ. We test the transferability of our proposed SGM with vary-
ing decay parameter γ ∈ [0.1, 1.0], where γ = 1.0 means no decay on the residual gradients.
The attacks are crafted by 10-step SGM on 5000 random ImageNet validation images. The results
against 3 target models (VGG19, SE154 and IncV3) are illustrated in Figure 3. As can be observed,
the trends are very consistent against different target models. On DenseNet source models, decreas-
ing decay parameter (increasing decay strength) tends to improve transferability until it exceeds a
certain threshold, e.g., γ = 0.5. This is because the decay encourages the attack to focus on more
transferable low-level information, however, it becomes less sufficient if all high-level class-relevant
information is ignored. On ResNet source models, decreasing decay parameter can constantly im-
prove transferability for γ ≥ 0.2. Compared to DenseNet source models, ResNets require more
8
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Figure 3: Parameter tuning: the success rates of black-box attacks crafted by 10-step SGM with
varying decay parameter γ ∈ [0.1, 1.0]. The solid and dash curves represent results on ResNet and
DenseNet source models respectively.
Table 6: Multi-step transferability of ensemble-based attack: the success rates (%±std over 5 ran-
dom runs) of multi-step attacks crafted by different methods on an ensemble of 3 source models
(e.g. RN34, RN152 and DN201) against 7 unsecured target models. The best results are in bold.
Source Attack VGG19 RN152 DN201 SE154 IncV3 IncV4 IncRes
RN34
+
RN152
+
DN201
PGD 86.69±0.20 99.99±0.01 99.99±0.02 69.65±0.71 65.95±0.35 59.30±0.32 53.91±0.40
TI 84.35±0.21 99.59±0.11 99.77±0.06 71.67±0.19 67.22±0.82 66.02±0.66 56.83±0.89
MI 92.86±0.19 99.91±0.04 99.91±0.06 86.11±0.38 83.25±0.35 79.25±1.16 76.53±0.66
DI 96.34±0.23 99.84±0.20 99.84±0.20 89.72±0.52 87.53±0.29 85.04±0.75 81.11±0.44
SGM 97.36±0.17 99.87±0.07 99.86±0.09 90.40±0.26 87.86±0.51 82.97±0.71 80.93±0.55
DI+SGM 98.65±0.08 99.84±0.04 99.86±0.04 94.36±0.19 93.08±0.41 89.56±0.07 88.27±0.43
Table 7: Transferability of ensemble-based attack against secured models: the success rates (%±std
over 5 random runs) of black-box attacks crafted on an ensemble of 3 source models (e.g. RN34,
RN152 and DN201). The best results are in bold.
Source Attack IncV3ens3 IncVens4 IncResens3
RN34
+
RN152
+
DN201
PGD 37.63±0.37 32.69±0.62 23.49±0.55
TI 75.04±0.50 75.94±0.63 66.24±0.45
MI 54.68±0.27 50.24±0.48 39.27±0.33
DI 65.29±0.31 57.48±0.45 46.41±0.42
SGM 66.08±0.42 62.22±0.73 51.16±0.12
TI+SGM 87.65±1.00 85.11±0.27 77.75±0.41
decay on the residual gradients. Recalling that skip connections reveal more transferable informa-
tion of the source model, ResNets require more penalty on the residual gradients to increase the
importance of skip gradients that reveal more transferable information of the source model.
As for the selection of γ under a scenario without knowing the target model, from Figure 3 and
Appendix C, we can see that the influence of γ is more related to the source model rather than the
target model, that is, given a source model, the best γ against different target models are generally
the same. This makes the selection of γ quite straightforward: choosing the best γ on the source
model(s). For instance, in Figure 3, suppose the unknown target model is SE154 (middle figure),
the adversary could tune γ on source model DN201 to attack VGG19 (left figure) and find the best
γ = 0.5. The attacks crafted on DN201 with γ = 0.5 indeed achieved the best success rate against
the SE154 target model (and other target models).
Ensemble-based Attacks. It has been shown that attacking multiple source models simultaneously
can improve the transferability of the crafted adversarial examples, and is commonly adopted in
practice. We follow the ensemble-based strategy (Liu et al., 2017) and craft attacks on an ensemble
of RN34, RN152 and DN201. According to the discussion above, we select the best γ individually
for each source model: choose γ for source RN34 and RN152 against target DN201, and γ for
source DN201 against target RN152. The success rates (transferability) against 7 unsecured models
and 3 secured models are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. Similar to the results of single
source model attacks, against unsecured target models, SGM has a similar standalone performance
with DI, better than the others (except the two “white-box” scenarios against RN152 and DN201).
When combined with other methods, e.g. DI, it improves the success rates again by a large margin.
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Figure 4: White-box success rate for FGSM versus SGM. In (b) and (c), each color corresponds to
one model, with FGSM is represented by solid curve and SGM is represented by dashed curve.
Against secured models, SGM achieves the second best standalone transferability, with TI is still
the best. When combined with TI, SGM improves the success rate by ∼ 10% consistently against
all secured target models. In particular, against IncV3ens3, TI+SGM achieves higher success rate
(87.65%) than reported in (Dong et al., 2019) (84.8%), even if only 3 source models are used here
and the source models (e.g. RN34, RN152 and DN201) are all of different architecture to IncV3
target model ((Dong et al., 2019) uses 6 source models including even the IncV3 model). From all
aspects analyzed above, the existence of skip connections makes transferable attacks much easier to
craft in practice.
Improving Weak White-box Attacks. In addition to the black-box transferability, we next show
that SGM can also improve the weak (one-step) white-box attack FGSM. Note that the one-step
version of SGM is equivalent to FGSM plus residual gradient decay. Our experiments are conducted
on the 8 source models, and the white-box success rates under maximum L∞ perturbation  = 8
(a typical white-box setting) are shown in Figure 4a. As can be observed, using SGM can help
improve the adversarial strength (i.e., higher success rate). We then vary the maximum perturbation
 ∈ [1, 64], and show the results on ResNet and DenseNet models separately in Figure 4b and
Figure 4c. Compared to FGSM, SGM can always give better adversarial strength, except when  is
extremely small ( ≤ 2). When the perturbation space becomes infinitely small, the loss landscape
within the space becomes flat and the gradient points to the optimal perturbation direction. However,
when the perturbation space expands, one-step gradient becomes less accurate due to changes in
the loss landscape (success rate decreases as  increases from 4 to 16), and in this case, the skip
gradient which contains more low-level information is more reliable than the residual gradient (the
improvement is more significant for  ∈ [4, 16] ). Another interesting observation is that adversarial
strength decreases when the model becomes more complex from RN18 to RN152, or DN121 to
DN201. This is likely because the loss landscape of complex models is steeper than shallow models,
making one-step gradient less reliable.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified a surprising property of the skip connections used by many state-of-
the-art ResNet-like neural networks, that is, they can be easily used to generate highly transferable
adversarial examples. To demonstrate this architectural “weakness”, we proposed the Skip Gradient
Method (SGM) to craft adversarial examples using more gradients from the skip connections rather
than the residual ones, via a decay factor on gradients. We conducted a series of transfer attack
experiments with 8 source models and 10 target models including 7 unsecured and 3 secured models,
and showed that attacks crafted by SGM have significantly better transferability than those crafted
by existing methods. When combined with existing techniques, SGM can also boost state-of-the-art
transferability by a huge margin. We believe the high adversarial transferability of skip connections
is due to the fact that they expose extra low-level information which is more transferable across
different DNNs. Our findings in this paper not only remind researchers in adversarial research to
pay attention to the architectural vulnerability of DNNs, but also raise new challenges for secure
DNN architecture design.
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A VISUALIZATION OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES CRAFTED BY SGM
In this section, we visualize 6 clean images and their corresponding adversarial examples crafted
using our SGM on either a ResNet-152 or a DenseNet201 in Figure 5. These visualization results
show that the generated adversarial perturbations are human imperceptible.
Figure 5: Visualization of 6 clean images and their corresponding adversarial examples. The clean
images are shown in the top row, adversarial images crafted on ResNet-152 are shown in the middle
row, while those crafted on DenseNet-201 are shown in the bottom row. All adversarial images are
crafted using our proposed SGM (10-step) under maximum perturbation  = 16.
B COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED RESULTS
In this section, we compare the experimental settings in previous and our works, and discuss some
small discrepancies of the baseline performance reported in ours and previous works.
Table 8 and 9 summarizes these differences for single-source and ensemble-based attack respec-
tively. Out of all these works (Dong et al., 2018; 2019; Xie et al., 2019), results reported in (Xie
et al., 2019) are more complete. Our reported success rate of baseline attacks (e.g. MI and DI)
matches that reported in (Xie et al., 2019), sometimes even higher. The slight discrepancy is caused
by the difference in experimental settings. Table 10 summarizes the different source models used
by baseline attacks, and Table 11 summarizes the difference in dataset, number of test images, input
image size, maximum L∞ perturbation , number of attack steps N and attack step size α. Com-
pared to 299 × 299 image size, here we use a more standard image size 224 × 224 on ImageNet.
The use of smaller input size may reduce the effectiveness of existing attacks (Simon-Gabriel et al.,
2019).
In another work by Liu et al. (2017), 81% success rate was reported for optimization-based attack
crafted on ResNet-152 against target VGG16, which is higher than our 65.52% from ResNet-152 to
VGG19. This is because they did not restrict the maximum perturbation . The root mean square
deviation (RMSD) of their attacks is 22.83,which indicates that many pixels are perturbed more
than 16 pixel values. In our experiments, the RMSD is 6.29 for PGD, 7.71 for SGM, and 12.55 for
MI. This appears to be another reason for the performance discrepancy. Note that the advantage of
bounded small perturbation is increasing imperceptibility to human observers (see Figure 5).
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Table 8: Previously reported attack success rates (%) of baseline single-source attacks against 6
target models. “-” means no results were reported.
Reference Attack IncV3 IncV4 IncRes IncV3ens3 IncV3ens4 IncResens3
Dong et al. (2018)
FGSM 35.0 28.2 27.5 14.6 13.2 7.5
BIM 26.7 22.7 21.2 9.3 8.9 6.2
MI 53.6 48.9 44.7 22.1 21.7 12.9
Dong et al. (2019)
FGSM - - - 20.2 17.7 9.9
MI - - - 25.1 23.7 13.3
DI - - - 40.5 36.0 24.1
Xie et al. (2019)
FGSM 34.4 28.50 27.1 12.4 11.0 6.0
PGD 20.8 17.2 14.9 5.4 4.6 2.8
MI 50.1 44.1 42.2 18.2 15.2 9.0
DI 53.8 49.0 44.8 13.0 11.1 6.9
Ours
FGSM 26.56 21.03 19.10 - - -
PGD 26.56 21.03 19.10 12.47 10.72 6.97
MI 50.22 43.32 41.71 24.20 22.04 16.10
DI 53.95 47.16 43.47 34.84 29.23 21.64
Table 9: Previously reported attack success rates (%) of ensemble-based baseline attacks against 6
target models. “-” means no results were reported.
Reference Attack IncV3 IncV4 IncRes IncV3ens3 IncV3ens4 IncResens3
Dong et al. (2018)
FGSM 45.7 39.9 38.8 15.4 15.0 6.4
BIM 72.1 61.0 54.4 18.6 18.7 9.9
MI 87.9 81.2 76.5 37.6 40.3 23.3
Dong et al. (2019)
FGSM - - - 27.5 23.7 13.4
MI - - - 50.5 48.3 32.8
DI - - - 66.0 63.3 45.9
TI+DI - - - 84.8 82.7 78.0
Xie et al. (2019)
PGD 43.7 36.4 33.3 12.9 15.1 8.8
MI 69.9 67.9 64.1 36.3 35.0 30.4
DI 71.4 65.9 64.6 22.8 26.1 15.8
DI+MI 80.7 80.6 80.7 44.6 44.5 39.4
Ours
PGD 65.95 59.30 53.91 37.63 32.69 23.49
MI 83.25 79.25 76.53 54.68 50.24 39.27
DI 87.53 85.04 81.11 65.29 57.48 46.41
DI+SGM 93.08 89.56 88.27 80.14 76.52 66.40
TI+SGM - - - 87.65 85.11 77.75
Table 10: Source models used by existing single-source and ensemble-based black-box attacks.
“Hold-out” refers to the hold-out target model from the group, with all remaining models are used
as source models. Group 1 consists of ResNet-v2-152, IncV3, IncV4 and IncRes, while group 2
consists of ResNet-v2-152, IncV3, IncV4, IncRes, IncV3ens3, IncV3ens4 and IncResens3.
Reference Single-source attack Ensemble-based attack
Dong et al. (2018) ResNet-v2-152 hold-out from group 1 or group 2
Dong et al. (2019) ResNet-v2-152 hold-out from group 1
Xie et al. (2019) ResNet-v2-152 hold-out from group 2
Ours RN152 RN34 + RN152 + DN201
For proper implementation, we use open-source codes and pretrained models for our experiments,
e.g., AdverTorch (Ding et al., 2019) for FGSM, PGD and MI, and source/target models from two
GitHub repositories†‡§ for all models. We reproduced DI and TI in PyTorch.
†https://github.com/Cadene/pretrained-models.pytorch
‡https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/slim
§https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/adv_
imagenet_models
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Table 11: Difference in experimental settings of our work compared to previous works.“NeurIPS
2017” indicates the dataset used for NeurIPS 2017 adversarial competition. : maximum per-pixel
perturbation; N : number of attack steps; α: attack step size.
Reference Dataset Number Input size  N α
Dong et al. (2018) ImageNet 1000 299× 299 16 10 1.6
Dong et al. (2019) NeurIPS 2017 1000 299× 299 16 10 1.6
Xie et al. (2019) ImageNet 5000 299× 299 15 19 1.0
Ours ImageNet 5000 224× 224 16 10 / 20 2.0
C TRANSFERABILITY OF DECAY PARAMETER γ
In this section, we study the “transferability” of decay parameter γ across different target models.
RN152 and DN201 are used as the source model, and the target model are varying to observe trends.
As indicated in Figure 6, all black-box target models share the same best selection of γ, which
makes γ selection quite simple. Even if the true target model is unknown, the adversary can tune the
gamma for a resnet-like neural network through another model and obtain the best selection as well.
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Figure 6: “Transferability” of decay parameter: the success rates of black-box attacks crafted by
10-step SGM with varying decay parameter γ ∈ [0.1, 1.0]. The curves represent results against
different target models respectively.
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